Committee for Compensation of Oslo Victims

The Petition

What Oslo cost the Israeli economy

NIS 540-557 billion (about $146-151 billion) in budget and direct costs, 1994-2025. Including the 2023-2025 loss of output: NIS 717-734 billion (about $194-198 billion).

The initiative's position: this whole cost is the result of the continuing failure to oblige the Palestinian side to abandon terror, and of a process the United States sponsored and oversaw. Every row below has a named source. Rows that overlap are left out, so the figures add up.

Cumulative deaths in terror and combat since September 1993: 4,180-4,468 (a range, not an official count). The Accountant General puts direct war spending 2023-2025 at NIS 231 billion (defence 166.2, compensation 27.3, rehabilitation and civilian 37.9). The Bank of Israel measured the output loss at NIS 177 billion.

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database · Bank of Israel, 2025 annual report, ch. 2 · Ctech on the Accountant General report, 16 Sep 2026 · Workbook (Excel): every figure, source and assumption

Not counted, so the true cost is higher: output lost before 2023 (tourism, investment, the Second Intifada), rehabilitation of the wounded, the value of lives, credit-rating effects, private security spending. The sums are also not reduced by the US aid Israel received.

The claim against the United States

What the initiative demands

The United States sponsored Oslo, hosted its signing, and in the Wye River Memorandum (23 October 1998) took on an oversight role: the CIA was to referee compliance with the Palestinian security commitments. The initiative's demand: the United States bears the costs that followed, in full, and any wind-down of US military aid should come only after that account is settled.

Christian Science Monitor, 27 Oct 1998

The sum, under stated assumptions (NIS billion, on Sum A)

The full grid, including Sum B and a dollar column, is in the workbook. Every percentage is a yellow cell you can change.

Hamas and the 2006 election: what is documented

In September 2005 Prime Minister Sharon said Israel "will not provide any support" for Palestinian elections in which Hamas takes part, unless it disarms and disavows its charter. The Bush administration worked on a formula and pressed for the vote to go ahead on 25 January 2006, including voting in East Jerusalem. On 15 January 2006 the Israeli cabinet under acting Prime Minister Olmert allowed East Jerusalem voting and vowed to prevent Hamas participation. Hamas won. The documented failure is the US decision to hold the election without requiring Hamas to disarm. The sources do not show that the US forced Israel to accept Hamas: Israel opposed its participation and did not cancel the vote.

The Forward, 30 Sep 2005 · The Independent, 4 Jan 2006 · The Guardian, 16 Jan 2006

America's responsibility for Israel's endless wars

US military aid to Israel has not stopped. The record, dated:

The initiative's position: America's responsibility is for Israel's endless wars. The claim is therefore a demand that the US answer for the costs, not a response to a halt in aid - no halt has occurred, as the dated record above shows.

"A Jewish state": what Palestinian leaders said, to whom and when

Each entry is a named official, a date and the audience reported. Quotations are as translated by the cited outlet.

The pattern in these sources: public refusal in Arabic-language and Palestinian media; softer or conditional wording to Israeli audiences (2014); private flexibility by the chief negotiator in 2007. We did not find one statement where a named official accepts "Jewish state" in English and rejects it in Arabic in the same words; the 2007 Erekat contrast (closed room against public) is the closest. The PLO's 1988 Declaration of Independence itself cites UN Resolution 181, which provides for "one Arab, one Jewish" state.

Palestinian Declaration of Independence, 1988

UNRWA: funding, incitement and terror use of facilities

Palestinian commitments and alleged breaches: an analysis

Explicit duties, not a general expectation

In his 9 September 1993 letter to Rabin, Arafat committed the PLO to recognizing Israel, rejecting terrorism and violence, and restraining and disciplining PLO personnel. Oslo II (28 September 1995) added duties to prevent terrorism (XV), restrictions on armed forces and weapons (XIV), and measures against incitement within jurisdiction (XXII). These are standards for assessing compliance, not a guarantee that no attack would ever occur.

JTA: 1993 recognition letters · Oslo II, 1995 (PA-X)

Terrorism and enforcement

The Mitchell report of 30 April 2001 called for a full PA effort to prevent attacks, apprehend and incarcerate terrorists within its jurisdiction, restore security cooperation and prevent gunfire from populated areas. It recorded Israeli accusations of support for terrorism and releases of detainees, and the PA denial. It expressly was not a tribunal determining guilt. The initiative calls for an incident-by-incident assessment of authority, knowledge, capacity and actual enforcement.

Mitchell report, 30 April 2001

Hamas is not the PA or the PLO

Hamas is a US-designated terrorist organization, not a signatory to Oslo. CRS records its 2006 election victory and forcible seizure of Gaza in 2007. Its armed infrastructure conflicts with the framework in Article XIV. Attributing a particular breach to the PA or PLO requires evidence of jurisdiction, control, assistance and enforcement capacity at that time. Loss of control over Gaza does not prove that the PA ordered every Hamas attack.

Oslo II, 1995 (PA-X) · CRS: Hamas background and US policy

Incitement and financial incentives

Article XXII requires action against incitement within jurisdiction. Official publications, teaching materials, employee statements and armed-group content must be distinguished. Mitchell called for both sides to curb incitement. Reuters reported on 10 February 2025 that Abbas decreed an end to the previous prisoner/family payment system and a transfer to a new mechanism. Implementation and incentives require scrutiny; we do not claim the old system continues unchanged.

Oslo II, 1995 (PA-X) · Mitchell report, 30 April 2001 · Reuters, 10 February 2025

Bill Clinton on Arafat and the failed Barak-Arafat peace effort

The mediator's account

At the DealBook Summit on 4 December 2024, reported the next day by the Times of Israel, Clinton said Arafat had walked away from an opportunity for a Palestinian state and warned that "you can’t complain 25 years later" after rejecting a once-in-a-lifetime peace opportunity. This is direct criticism of Palestinian leadership decisions in the process involving Ehud Barak and Arafat. The July 2000 Camp David summit must be distinguished from the parameters and negotiations later that year. They were not one signed agreement.

Times of Israel, 5 December 2024

What this supports

The initiative considers the mediator's account a reason to examine Palestinian leadership responsibility and public accounts of the failure. Rejecting a proposed final settlement is not, by itself, a breach of an interim agreement.

Times of Israel, 5 December 2024 · Oslo II, 1995 (PA-X)

US policy: political influence and the growth of Hamas

The public-policy case

The initiative calls for scrutiny of whether the United States promoted diplomacy, elections and funding without adequate enforcement of security commitments, leaving Israelis exposed to unmanaged risks. The US Office of the Historian describes a limited US role in the original secret Oslo negotiations, followed by substantial investment in the process.

US Office of the Historian

The 2006 election-policy failure

Hamas's January 2006 victory gave a terrorist organization major parliamentary and governmental power. This occurred under George W. Bush, before Obama's presidency and Hillary Clinton's tenure as secretary of state. A May 2007 CRS report described the failure of isolation to remove Hamas from power and the argument that sanctions opened space for Iranian influence. The initiative calls for scrutiny of the assumption that elections could moderate an armed organization without disarmament or recognition of Israel. But the US and Quartet demanded recognition, rejection of violence and acceptance of prior agreements, and cut assistance to the Hamas-led government. This was not unconditional US recognition of Hamas as legitimate.

CRS, 9 May 2007 · CRS: Hamas background and US policy

Hillary Clinton and pressure over Jerusalem construction

In her 22 March 2010 AIPAC address, Clinton said new construction in East Jerusalem and the West Bank undermined trust and talks, and described requests for Israeli confidence-building steps. The initiative questions whether such public pressure constrained Israeli policy and sent an unbalanced message about Palestinian non-enforcement. In the same address she endorsed a democratic Jewish Israel and conditioned Hamas's place in negotiations on recognizing Israel, renouncing violence and accepting signed agreements.

Clinton AIPAC address, 22 March 2010 (JTA)

Obama: 1967 lines with swaps, not abolishing the Jewish state

On 19 May 2011 Obama called for negotiations based on 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps. The territorial pressure and security assumptions are open to criticism. But his speech expressly endorsed Israel as a Jewish state and homeland of the Jewish people alongside Palestine, and rejected Hamas's path of terror. It left Jerusalem unresolved. We therefore do not claim he demanded replacing Israel with a non-Jewish single state or recognized Hamas as a legitimate peace partner in that speech.

Obama speech, 19 May 2011

OneVoice and V15: a documented oversight failure

A bipartisan Senate investigative report dated 12 July 2016 found that infrastructure built partly with 2013-2014 State Department grants was used after the grants ended to support V15 in Israel's 2015 election. It also found OneVoice complied with the grants and no evidence that grant funds themselves were spent to influence the election. The report criticized the absence of post-grant restrictions. This supports a focused critique of indirect political influence and oversight failure under Obama, not proof of a personal order from Obama or Hillary Clinton. The grant was approved in 2013, after she left the State Department.

US Senate report, 12 July 2016

Causation must be proved

Chronology alone does not prove US policy caused Hamas's growth or a particular massacre. An assessment needs a specific decision, information available at the time, a money or equipment trail, an influence mechanism, a feasible alternative and attributable damage. CRS also identifies Iran, other financing, local control, weapons and tunnels. The initiative sees these competing causes as reasons for investigation, not reasons to exempt US policy from scrutiny.

CRS: Hamas background and US policy

From accountability to a compensation framework

What we seek

We seek a Knesset discussion on legislation for an inquiry, victim-loss documentation, a compensation fund and a diplomatic demand for US participation in proven costs. We also seek examination of a future claim or agreed settlement, without suggesting an existing cause of action against the US has been established. Israel has not joined this initiative and no lawsuit is being announced.

The legal limits

A US witness signature is not a compensation guarantee. Suing the United States in its own courts requires an applicable waiver of immunity. 28 USC 2680 excludes, among other matters, governmental discretion and claims arising in a foreign country from the FTCA framework. Israeli legislation alone cannot remove US immunity or bind a US court. The immediate route is public and parliamentary; an enforceable legal route needs specialist assessment of jurisdiction, law, immunity, evidence and causation.

28 USC 2680

Accurate attribution: what was said about "Jewish or democratic" and "sharing the neighborhood"

The documented quote: John Kerry, 28 December 2016

In a speech on policy toward the conflict, Secretary of State John Kerry of the Obama administration said, verbatim: "If the choice is one-state, Israel can either be Jewish or democratic, it cannot be both and it won't ever live in peace." The statement is conditional: Kerry said this would be the result of a one-state outcome, and he urged preserving the two-state solution. The sentence is Kerry's. It must not be attributed to Hillary Clinton.

Haaretz: Kerry speech, 28 Dec 2016 · NBC News, 28 Dec 2016

The initiative's position (an argument, not a proven fact)

The initiative's position: Kerry's wording assumes that Israel's Jewish and democratic character collide unless a Palestinian state is created. That makes recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people depend on a political outcome Israel does not control alone. The initiative holds that foreign policy built on that assumption, and a consistent preference for liberal democracy as the only yardstick of stability, deserve public examination. No legal or international body has ruled that such policy is an offence of "subversion" against a state's existence. The initiative does not claim that, and does not attribute to anyone an intent to destroy Israel.

Counter-evidence: what the Obama administration and Clinton actually said

In Jerusalem on 21 March 2013, Obama spoke of a future "in which a Jewish, democratic state is protected and accepted." Kerry said in 2016 that US policy aimed to preserve Israel's future as a Jewish and democratic state. Hillary Clinton told AIPAC on 21 March 2016 that she believed two states were the way to secure Israel's survival as a "strong Jewish and democratic state." The Kerry quote therefore does not prove an intent to turn Israel into a "state of all its citizens". It records a policy position that can be criticised.

NPR: Obama in Jerusalem, 21 Mar 2013 · JTA: Clinton AIPAC speech, 21 Mar 2016 · VOA, 28 Dec 2016

What we do not claim: "share the neighborhood"

The phrase "share the neighborhood" is Obama's, from an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic (published 10 March 2016). He said it about Saudi Arabia and Iran, who "need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace." We found no Obama statement saying Israel should "share the neighborhood" or divide the country, so the initiative does not present the phrase that way.

NBC News, 10 Mar 2016 · Reuters, 10 Mar 2016

The aid money: where it actually goes

The documented facts

The current memorandum of understanding (fiscal years 2019-2028) provides Israel $38 billion over 10 years: $3.3 billion a year in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) plus $500 million a year for missile-defense cooperation. It was signed in September 2016 under the Obama administration and, per the White House, is the largest military-assistance pledge in US history. Per Reuters, it phases out Israel's ability to spend a quarter of the funds with its own industry; per CRS, off-shore procurement ends entirely in fiscal year 2028. Foreign Policy reported in 2016 that the administration sought to require that all of it be spent on US-made weapons, benefiting firms such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. Defense Daily noted the deal lets Israel buy more Lockheed F-35s and Boeing F-15s.

White House fact sheet, 14 Sep 2016 · US State Department: security cooperation with Israel · Reuters, 20 Sep 2016 · CRS RL33222 (PDF) · Foreign Policy, 19 Aug 2016 · Defense Daily, 14 Sep 2016

Who says the money subsidises the US arms industry

The claim does not come only from critics of aid. Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to Washington, wrote in Tablet (September 2021) that the aid comes as FMF designed to facilitate sales of American equipment, so nearly three-quarters is spent in the United States, as a subsidy for the domestic arms industry that creates tens of thousands of jobs. Reason (opinion, September 2016) wrote that the main winner of the expanded aid is the US defense industry. These are authors' positions; the figures themselves are in the official sources above.

Tablet: Michael Oren, 23 Sep 2021 · Reason, 15 Sep 2016

The initiative's position (argument)

The initiative's position: presenting aid to the public as "money given to Israel" is misleading, because a growing share returns to American companies, so publics in both countries should see the full balance. The initiative also argues that the US arms industry has an economic interest in continuing demand in Israel and the region, which creates an incentive that does not favour ending the conflict. This is the initiative's hypothesis: we found no source establishing that US policy aims to preserve the conflict. The historical argument that America's own colonial past undermines its role as a fair mediator is likewise a position of the initiative, not a legal finding.

Counter-evidence

The aid does strengthen Israel's military capability, including missile defense ($500 million a year). Reuters reported that Israel's defense industry expected a hit from the off-shore procurement phase-out, meaning part of the money has so far also supported Israeli industry. The Obama administration and Kerry explicitly worked for a two-state arrangement. "Subsidising the industry" and "strengthening Israel" are not contradictory: both effects hold at once.

Reuters, 20 Sep 2016

Qatar: mediation, funding and media - what is documented and what is argued

Qatar as a mediator the US brought into matters concerning Israel

In 2012 a Hamas political office opened in Doha. Qatari officials, including Qatar's ambassador to Washington Meshal bin Hamad Al Thani in a Wall Street Journal op-ed (30 October 2023), say this followed a US request to open an indirect channel. That is a Qatari claim; we found no explicit confirmation from the US government. On 10 March 2022 President Biden designated Qatar a major non-NATO ally. In the November 2023 hostage deal, Qatar and Egypt mediated with the agreement of Israel, Hamas and the US; per Reuters, Qatar asked the White House to form an advisory team right after October 7. On 15 January 2025 Qatar, Egypt and the US jointly announced an agreement to release hostages and move to a ceasefire. On 29 September 2025, after the Israeli strike in Doha, President Trump signed Executive Order 14353 assuring Qatar's security, including military action if attacked; Axios described it as part of "compensation" to Qatar for the strike.

AP, 27 Nov 2023 · Al-Monitor, 19 Oct 2023 · Ammon News on the WSJ op-ed, 30 Oct 2023 · Reuters: Qatar major non-NATO ally, 10 Mar 2022 · Reuters: secret negotiations, 22 Nov 2023 · Qatar MFA joint statement, 15 Jan 2025 · White House: Executive Order 14353 · Axios, 1 Oct 2025

Hamas funding and support for political Islam: what was said and by whom

On 4 March 2014 US Treasury Under Secretary David Cohen said in an official address that "Qatar, a longtime US ally, has for many years openly financed Hamas." Around then Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain accused Qatar of backing Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood; The National noted that Washington did not view the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation. A December 2023 New York Times report documented that Israel approved money transfers from Qatar to Gaza; per NYT, CNN and Haaretz reporting, over $1 billion reached Gaza in 2012-2018 with Israeli approval. Qatar presents itself as a neutral mediator invited by the parties. Note: these sources do not establish that Qatar "spreads Muslim Brotherhood terror"; they contain accusations and assessments by particular parties, and Qatar denies them.

US Treasury, Cohen, 4 Mar 2014 · The National, 11 Mar 2014 · New York Times, 10 Dec 2023 · CNN, 11 Dec 2023 · Qatar MFA: mediation

Al Jazeera: who has called it a Qatari propaganda channel

It matters who said what. (1) US diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks (2010) described Al Jazeera as a tool of Qatari foreign policy; a 2009 cable said it could be used "as a bargaining tool" to repair relationships with other countries. (2) On 14 September 2020 the US Justice Department determined that Al Jazeera's US arm AJ+ is "an agent of the Government of Qatar" and must register under FARA; Al Jazeera rejected this, and in 2021 senators said it had not registered. (3) Israel: on 1 April 2024 the Knesset passed the Foreign Broadcasters Law, and on 5 May 2024 the government voted unanimously to shut the channel's operations in Israel based on a Shin Bet opinion; the Prime Minister accused the channel of supporting the October 7 attack. Al Jazeera called the closure a "criminal act", and the UN and rights groups condemned it. These facts show that several officials treat the channel as Qatar-funded and Qatar-directed, but "propaganda" is the assessment of whoever said it, not a judicial finding.

Guardian: WikiLeaks cables on Al Jazeera, 5 Dec 2010 · Independent, 6 Dec 2010 · CNN: DOJ order to AJ+, 16 Sep 2020 · Al Jazeera response, 17 Sep 2020 · Senator Grassley, 2 Jul 2021 · Library of Congress: Israel closes Al Jazeera, May 2024 · CNN, 5 May 2024

Funding of American universities

Under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act, universities report foreign gifts and contracts of $250,000 or more. The Education Department portal launched in January 2026 shows Cornell receiving the most Qatari funding (about $2.3 billion), per Inside Higher Ed. Per the Middle East Forum, an advocacy research group, Qatar is the largest foreign source in the cumulative file, with about $8.98 billion of entries, mostly contracts. We did not check the portal data directly. Reporting is not evidence of wrongdoing and often reflects academic ties including Doha campuses, so the figures do not prove influence on US policy toward Israel. The topic is relevant as a question of transparency.

Inside Higher Ed, 28 Jan 2026 · Middle East Forum notes

The initiative's position (argument) and counter-evidence

The initiative's position: when the US brings into negotiations concerning Israel a state that officials, including the US Treasury, accused of financing Hamas, and that funds a media channel American and Israeli officials describe as an instrument of its government, the public deserves transparency about Qatar's role and the US interests behind it. Counter-evidence: Israel itself approved transfers of Qatari money, Qatari mediators worked with Israeli officials on truces (AP, November 2023), and the mediation led to the release of hostages. The public is entitled to know who decided, but these facts alone do not prove the US acted against Israel.

AP, 27 Nov 2023

Europe as a cautionary example: mass migration and its outcomes - what is documented

Scale of the migration

In 2015, 1,255,600 people applied for asylum for the first time in the EU, more than double 2014 (626,065), per Eurostat. Syrians were the largest group (362,800), followed by Afghans and Iraqis. Per Pew, 1.3 million applied in the EU, Norway and Switzerland in 2015, nearly double the previous record (about 700,000 in 1992). Pew estimated Europe had 25.8 million Muslims in 2016 (4.9% of the population), up from 19.5 million (3.8%) in 2010; even under a zero-migration scenario the share is projected to reach 7.4% by 2050, because of age and fertility. The figures do not distinguish asylum seekers from long-settled citizens.

Eurostat, 4 Mar 2016 · Pew, 2 Aug 2016 · Pew, 29 Nov 2017

Assessments by European leaders (attributed)

German Chancellor Merkel said on 16 October 2010 that the multicultural society in Germany had "utterly failed" (BBC). UK Prime Minister Cameron said on 5 February 2011 that "state multiculturalism has failed" (BBC). Swedish Prime Minister Kristersson blamed "irresponsible immigration policy and failed integration" for severe gang violence on 28 September 2023 (DW; address to the nation: government.se). These are politicians' statements, not research; they are presented as quotations only.

BBC: Merkel, 17 Oct 2010 · BBC: Cameron, 5 Feb 2011 · DW: Sweden, 29 Sep 2023 · Swedish Government: address to the nation, 29 Sep 2023

Measured outcomes: mixed evidence

In Germany, the BKA reported 280,000 new asylum seekers in 2016 after 890,000 in 2015. Reuters reported in April 2017 that the number of migrant criminal suspects rose by more than 50% in 2016. On the other side, DW reported in December 2016 on an analysis of BKA data finding no support for claims that refugee arrivals raised crime as portrayed, and a study in Regional Science and Urban Economics (2021) found no impact on crime from asylum seekers except migration-specific offences. An MPI study found 19% of refugees who arrived in 2015 were employed by 2017. These sources do not show that European states became unstable; public and political debate intensified, and Sweden recorded worsening gang violence.

BKA: Kriminalität im Kontext von Zuwanderung 2016 (PDF) · Reuters, 24 Apr 2017 · DW, 31 Dec 2016 · Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2021 · MPI: Germany refugee integration, 2019 (PDF)

The initiative's position (argument) and its limits

The initiative's position: the European example shows that preferring a single liberal-democratic framework, without regard to population composition and the pace of integration, does not guarantee stability, so caution is warranted before applying it to Israel as a condition for recognition. This is the initiative's comparison. Limits: Europe's situation does not prove what would happen in Israel; the sources do not establish failure of European states, and the studies above point to mixed results. Nothing here assigns blame to any religious group, and the initiative does not claim that.

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